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Introduction
This paper addresses the question as to whether interpersonal comparisons affect households' consumption-savings decisions. The literature on self-reported well-being and happiness leaves little doubt that positional concerns do affect people's utility. That is, people's utility functions not only depend on absolute consumption but also on relative consumption, U i = U (C i ,C) whereC denotes the consumption level of the household's reference group. Most prominently, Luttmer (2005) shows that, after controlling for own income, higher local average earnings lead to lower levels of self-reported happiness for U.S. households. 1
However, little is known as to what extent these consumption externalities actually influence the consumption-savings decisions of households. 2 Such behaviour would bear important implications for research on the relationship between income inequality and macroeconomic stability, which has attracted attention in the aftermath of the recent financial and economic crisis.
Meanwhile many economists assume that rising income inequality might have been a central root-cause for the crisis. Among others, Rajan (2010) argues that, as consumption of rich households increases with rising income inequality, low and middle class households reduce their savings despite of the rather poor evolution of their own income. Rising income inequality at the top of the distribution can thus trigger expenditure cascades. 3 A central behavioural assumption underlying this line of argument is the presence of upward-looking interpersonal comparisons, i.e. households compare their levels of consumption to those of richer households and develop higher consumption needs. Throughout this analysis we refer to this behaviour as "keeping up with the richer Joneses" (KURJ-behaviour).
Using household panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we present evidence that households reduce active savings in favour of consump-1 Other studies that examine interpersonal comparisons and the relationship between relative standing and well-being include for example Veenhoven (1991) , Diener et al. (1993) , Van de Stadt et al. (1985) , Kapteyn et al. (1997) , Clark (1996) , McBride (2001 ), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005 and Dynan and Ravina (2007) . See Frey and Stutzer (2002) or Luttmer (2005) for a more detailed discussion of this literature.
2 The idea that a household's consumption-savings decision is determined by changes in its position in the income distribution was first introduced by Duesenberry (1949) as the Relative Income Hypothesis (RIH). See Van Treeck (2013) for a detailed discussion of the literature on the macroeconomic impact of inequality and the reemergence of the RIH.
3 Rajan (2010) concludes that rising consumption needs of low and middle class U.S. households were eventually financed through the expansion of loans rather than incomes. This unsustainable credit-driven consumption brought about drastic economic consequences. Other prominent contributions that stress the macroeconomic risks of inequality comprise Stiglitz (2009) , Galbraith (2012) , Kumhof et al. (2012) and Al-Hussami and Remesal (2012). tion if the consumption level of households that are perceived to be richer increases.
Assuming upward-looking comparisons, we define a household's reference group to include all households that belong to a consumption decile above the household's own consumption decile. Thereby, we use the consumption distribution as an approximation of the perceived income distribution since households cannot directly observe other households' incomes but may indeed recognize changes in the consumption level of others. We find that reference consumption, defined as the mean consumption of all households in the reference group, negatively affects household savings. A one euro increase in the consumption of richer households reduces savings on average by up to 25 cents depending on the household's position in the income distribution. This paper builds on previous studies that have empirically analysed the economic consequences of positional concerns. Despite the insights from wellbeing research, there has been relatively little evidence for the impact of status comparisons on the actual economic behaviour of agents. 4 Valuable recent contributions that are most closely related to our analysis include Ravina (2011) , , Alvarez-Cuadrado and El-Attar Vilalta (2012) as well as Bertrand and Morse (2013) . Alvarez-Cuadrado and El-Attar Vilalta (2012) use the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics and explain household saving rates with different measures of inequality and average state income, i.e. they assume outward-looking comparisons. They find a robust negative effect of inequality on aggregate household savings. Besides this, they find that increases in upward-looking reference income, i.e. the mean income of all quintiles above the household's own income quintile, induce lower levels of household savings when controlling for changes in own income. Ravina (2011) and AlvarezCuadrado et al. (2012) estimate Euler-equations derived from a utility function that features both internal and external habits. Both show that regional average expenditures influence the growth rate of consumption. Bertrand and Morse (2013) present evidence for expenditure cascades using U.S. micro data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey: Based on state-year variation, the authors find a positive correlation between the expenditures of middle class households and households in the top income quintile.
Our analysis contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we estimate the effect of reference consumption on households' consumption-savings deci-sions. Our model reliably identifies the coefficient on reference consumption for several reasons. As our empirical strategy does not rely on regional variation in reference consumption, we are able to eliminate unobserved local area characteristics. In addition, the panel structure of the SOEP allows us to control for unobserved individual fixed effects. Finally, we do not define reference groups along demographic characteristics. This prevents our results from being driven by unobserved peer effects. Our results prove to be robust to changes in specification.
Second, we take into account the fact that comparisons are directed upwards which allows us to assess whether inequality changes can cause expenditure cascades. By examining multiple alternative definitions of a household's reference group, we are able to test this important assumption and draw a number of other conclusions with regard to the appropriate definition of reference group: (i)
Comparisons are indeed directed upwards. When including households who are perceived to be poorer in the reference group, the effect of reference consumption becomes negligible. (ii) The effect of reference consumption is strongest when the reference group is not restricted to a certain area or social peer-group. (iii)
The effect of upward-looking reference consumption is not solely driven by the expenditures of those households who are just slightly richer.
Third, the paper links the microeconometric evidence to the evolution of income inequality in Germany from 2002 to 2011 showing that, depending on the household's position in the income distribution, our model attributes up to 25 per cent of the change in household savings to the effects of changing reference consumption.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our conceptual approach and outlines the empirical strategy. Section 3 discusses the data and section 4 presents our estimation results and contribution analysis.
Section 5 addresses further implications of our findings and concludes.
Conceptual Approach and Empirical Strategy

The Consumption-savings Decision Under Interpersonal Comparisons
In order to formalize the intuition behind our conceptual approach, imagine a household whose utility depends on own consumption and leisure as well as on some measure of reference that drives interpersonal comparisons, Note that interdependent preferences do not directly imply If a change in the reference measure only reduces the level of utility but leaves the marginal utility of consumption relative to leisure unchanged, an optimizing household will not alter its consumption-savings decision despite the presence of consumption externalities. In such a case, one obtains the same consumption function as in a scenario without interpersonal comparisons. For forward-looking households, this would yield a consumption function of the form:
Thereby, IN C i,t denotes household disposable income, W i,t is wealth including human capital, AGE i,t is the age of the household head and M ACRO t includes macroeconomic factors such as the interest rate. The household's planning horizon is captured by h. Under KUJ-behavior, the household's consumption function evolves into:
The assumption of linearity is in line with theoretical research. The permanent-income version of the RIH suggested by Alvarez-Cuadrado and Van Long (2011) involves an additive specification of relative consumption leading to a consumption function that is linear in own lifetime income and lifetime income of the reference group. 78
The Nature of Interpersonal Comparisons
The empirical assessment of interpersonal comparisons requires one to address two crucial questions: (i) Which variable drives interpersonal comparisons? (ii)
Who forms the reference group of a household?
First, consumption is more positional than income. Among others, Solnick and Hemenway (1998) and Solnick and Hemenway (2005) find that certain goods 5 We abstract from the second standard argument of utility, leisure, as leisure is far less positional than consumption. See for example Solnick and Hemenway (1998) and Solnick and Hemenway (2005) .
6 Note that KURJ-behaviour is just a special case of KUJ-behaviour. 7 Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) also model relative consumption additively. 8 Although empirical studies dealing with the importance and effects of interdependent preferences are rare, there are quite a few other theoretical contributions exploring the effects of interpersonal comparisons. See for example Abel (1990) , Galí (1994) , Carroll et al. (1997) , Liu and Turnovsky (2005) or Al-Hussami and Remesal (2012) .
have a higher degree of positionality than others, i.e. they exhibit a greater impact on one's perceived relative status in society. For example, income is more positional than leisure, the consumption of private goods is more positional than that of public goods and, most importantly to our study, expenditures on visible consumption goods are more positional than expenses for safety and insurance. 9
The latter result suggests that it is mostly the visible part of one's income that initiates external effects with regard to the well-being of others. This seems intuitive as people are not able to directly observe other people's income levels.
People usually observe what other people consume and use this information to make inferences with respect to the income levels of those people. Consequently, the relative position of a household in the actual income distribution is not necessarily identical to the household's position in the perceived income distribution.
Hence, we use the distribution of consumption to approximate the perceived income distribution as this is relevant for positional concerns. Even though this measure of consumption still includes forms of non-visible consumption such as health expenditures, it is still clearly more visible than income and therefore likely to be a driving factor of interpersonal comparisons. We therefore define Second, in order to answer the question as to who belongs to a household's reference group we turn to two findings of the literature on self-reported wellbeing. Most importantly, interpersonal comparisons tend to be directed upwards as is found by Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) . In her microeconometric analysis of self-reported well-being, she shows that when reference income is defined as the mean income of the reference group, the negative effect of reference income is significantly higher for those whose own income is below the reference income. Similarly, Alvarez-Cuadrado and El-Attar Vilalta (2012) demonstrate that households in the upper half of the income distribution only react to changes in the income of their reference group if the latter does not include households from the bottom half of the distribution. We thus assume that the reference group of a household consists of all households with a higher relative position in the perceived income distribution.
Moreover, it is often assumed that the reference group is defined along categories such as region of residence, age or education assuming that people compare 9 Solnick and Hemenway base their conclusions on a survey in which they confront the respondents with a choice between two hypothetical scenarios of the type: A: Your home has seven rooms; other people's homes ten rooms. B: Your home has five rooms; other people's homes have three rooms. The percentage of respondents who gave positional answers, i.e. who, in this example, prefer B to A, differs between different goods which suggests that different goods are not equally positional.
themselves within certain subpopulations. 10 However, there is no consensus as to which of these categories really matters. To address this issue we construct four different concepts of a household's reference group. Using the categories region of residence (EAST-concept), age (AGE-concept) or education (EDU-concept), we create three separate sets of subpopulations. The fourth concept comprises the entire population (ALL-concept). All four concepts assume upward-looking reference groups, that is they do not include households with a lower relative position in the respective subpopulation.
To model reference consumption we divide the consumption distribution of the relevant (sub-)population(s) into 10 classes of equal size. The reference group of a household is then defined as all households that belong to consumption classes above the household's own consumption class and that are part of the same (sub-)population. Hence, the reference group of a household in the 5th decile includes all households of deciles 6 through 10. 11 This decile classification would result in the top ten per cent of the consumption distribution not having an upward-looking reference group which does not seem plausible. We thus split the upper ten per cent and define the top five per cent as the reference group of households in the 19th vingtile.
In order to demonstrate that the assumption of upward-looking comparisons is appropriate, i.e. that households' consumption-savings decisions are not affected by poorer households, we additionally construct three versions of outward-looking reference groups. This allows us to examine whether the effect of reference consumption is still present when poorer households are also part of the reference group.
Baseline Econometric Model
As our conceptual approach defines reference consumption as average consumption of all households who belong to consumption classes above the household's own consumption class (j) and who are part of the household's (sub-)population Kapteyn et al. (1997 ), Ferreri-Carbonell (2005 , McBride (2001) use one or more of these categories to construct reference groups. In contrast, Easterlin (1995) uses none of these categories assuming that people compare themselves to all citizens of their country.
11 This approach has also been suggested by Alvarez-Cuadrado and El-Attar Vilalta (2012) who apply a quintile categorization.
will increase by construction which leads to a spurious positive correlation between consumption and reference consumption. We control for this problem by interacting reference consumption with two dummy variables that distinguish between households who do not change consumption classes and those who hop into a different class over time. In the following we refer to the latter as class-
hoppers. 12
Due to the fact that the SOEP questionnaire captures active savings rather than consumption information, we use household savings as our dependent variable. Household active savings S i is defined as household disposable income minus consumption. Hence, reducing savings by a certain amount, while holding own disposable income constant, implies an increase of consumption by that exact amount. 13 We thus estimate the following baseline equation using pooled OLS:
Thereby, ∆S i,t , ∆IN C i,t and ∆REF i,t are first differences of a household's real savings, real disposable income and real reference consumption. ST AY i,t equals one if the household does not change its consumption class j from period t − 1 to t and HOP i,t equals one if the household does change its consumption class. X i,t is a vector of control variables including changes in the number of adults and children living in the household, the number of years of education, employment status and age of the household head. ST AT E i,t is a vector of state dummies and T IM E t is a vector of year dummies.
By taking three-year moving averages of household consumption and income, we control for transitory fluctuations. The Permanent Income Hypothesis predicts that households smooth transitory fluctuations in current income and only adjust consumption in response to permanent income changes. This argument can easily be extended to the household's relative position. 14 Since the upper five per cent of the consumption distribution cannot be assigned an upward-looking reference group, we exclude these households from the estimations. We cluster robust standard errors at the household level.
12 About one third (34.2 per cent) of the households in our sample are class-hoppers. 13 We will further discuss the question whether we can deduce consumption information from the savings information given in the SOEP in section 3.
14 Our approach follows Kopczuk and Song (2010) who take five-year-moving averages to approximate permanent earnings. In our robustness section we compare three-year-moving averages to current information and five-year-moving averages and show that the results are not driven by the degree of smoothing.
Interaction Analysis
We further ask whether the effects of reference consumption differ systematically between social subgroups and whether interpersonal comparisons impact certain parts of the income distribution more than others. To this end, we interact reference consumption with dummy variables for different levels of education and different types of employment status of the household head. We also estimate income class specific effects of reference consumption by interacting reference consumption with dummy variables for income deciles. As we are interested in the income distribution of the entire population, we use the ALL-concept for this analysis. In equation (4) 
Robustness Analysis
Apart from the problem of class-hoppers, our conceptual approach faces two other potential challenges to a causal interpretation of the coefficient on reference consumption: Omitted regional shocks and unobserved individual characteristics. For the latter, we have already taken care in our baseline model by taking first differences and thereby removing time-invariant individual heterogeneity. The former methodological problem arises from the potential correlation between consumption and reference consumption due to region-specific shocks that are not absorbed by the time and state fixed effects that capture the influences of national business cycles and time-invariant heterogeneity at the state level. Hence, we need to ensure that unobserved local area characteristics do not lead to spurious correlation between own and reference consumption. In the robustness section, we thus include a full set of state-year interactions to control for time-varying state-specific shocks, i.e. state business cycles. Beyond this, however, there is still scope for the potential impact of regional shocks that operate below the state level. We address this issue by comparing our baseline results to an adjusted measure of reference consumption which assumes that the reference group only comprises households not living in the same state. Even though this strategy effectively eliminates an important part of the household's reference group, it ensures that the effect of reference consumption is not the result of unobserved local characteristics such as variation in the local job or housing market.
Besides this, we carry out several additional robustness checks that address different definitions of reference group, the degree of smoothing income information and sample outliers.
Data 3.1 The Sample
Our analysis is based on household survey data from the German Socio-Economic (iii) In addition to that, we drop households for which monthly saving exceeds net monthly income. We end up with a sample consisting of 111,512 observations and at least 10,708 households in any given year. 15 Table 1 
Measures of Disposable Income, Savings and Consumption
The saving information used in our analysis is based on the one-shot question in the SOEP questionnaire: (2004) use active and passive saving measures in their analysis. Thereby, passive saving is defined as the change of wealth. For our analysis, however, households' consumption-savings decisions are best captured by an active savings measure that does not include wealth revaluation. Moreover, as there are only two waves including wealth information in the SOEP, constructing a measure of passive saving and especially examining its evolution over time is not feasible.
18 Unlike other micro data sets such as the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), the SOEP does not contain detailed information on expenditures. We are thus unable to investigate whether the effects of reference consumption differs across consumption categories. Bertrand and Morse (2013) use the CEX in order to differentiate the effect of upward looking comparisons by certain types of consumption goods. Surprisingly, they do not find convincing evidence for a Real monthly household disposable income is our most important control variable. It includes both labour and asset income as well as public and private transfers and is thus a very comprehensive measure of own income which enables us to control for a rich set of income sources that might affect households' consumption-savings decisions.
Results
4.1 Do Upward-Looking Comparisons Affect Households' Consumption-Savings Decisions?
Yes, they do. Table 2 shows the estimation results for our baseline specifications according to equation (3) . Column (1) reports the estimated effect of reference consumption when the upward-looking reference group includes the entire population (ALL-concept). In columns (2) link between visibility and degree of positionality using the visibility score proposed by Heffetz (2011) .
[ As expected, we also see that the negative effect of reference consumption is considerably stronger for class-hoppers than for households that do not change consumption classes. One might argue that the mechanism of changing consumption levels associated with an adjustment of the reference group is not necessarily counterintuitive. This is because with new levels of consumption, that are predominantly driven by income changes, consumption aspirations also change and a change of reference group can even account for such adjustments. Thus, the estimated coefficient for ST AY ers actually provides a lower bound of the effects of reference consumption. However, we chose to stick to this somewhat conservative approach and accept the potential underestimation of the average causal effect. Due to the lack of space, we do not report the coefficients for classhoppers in the remaining estimations of this paper. In the following interaction and robustness analysis, we will focus on the ALL-concept.
Are Comparisons Directed Upwards?
Yes, they are. To examine whether such status comparisons are directed upwards, we additionally construct three versions of outward-looking reference groups that include both richer and poorer households. These concepts are defined along certain social characteristics such as education or state of residence. Table 3 reports the corresponding effects of reference consumption. In column (1) the household's reference group includes all households with a similar level of education, in column (2) the reference group consists of all households living in the same of Germany's 16 states and in column (3) these dimensions are combined such that all households with a similar level of education and the same state of residence form the reference group. 19 One immediately recognizes that outward-looking reference consumption exhibits substantially smaller and by far less significant effects on household savings. In columns (1) and (2), the effect is not significant. Although the effect of reference consumption is significantly different from zero in column (3), it is substantially smaller compared the results of our baseline estimation which assumes upward-looking comparisons. The point estimate for the effect of reference consumption drops from about −0.13 (table 2, column (1)) to at most −0.04 (table 3, column (2)). We take this result as further evidence for the fact that comparisons are directed upwards. In addi-tion, we find this result confirming one of our main assumptions regarding the construction of reference consumption.
[ 
Interaction Analysis
To examine whether the effects of interpersonal comparisons differ between socio-economic subgroups we interact the change in reference consumption with dummy variables that capture different levels of education, different types of employment and the household's position in the income distribution. Table 4 shows the corresponding estimation results according to equation (4).
[ Column (1) reveals that the point estimates for households whose head attended school for a maximum of nine years (LOW-EDU) as well as for households whose head received thirteen years of schooling or attended college or university (HIGH-EDU) are slightly higher compared to that of households whose head has attended school for at least ten and at most twelve years (MID-EDU). However, these differences are not statistically significant. Column (2) paints a similar picture with regard to differences between different types of employment. Households with a self-employed household head appear to be more prone to changes in reference consumption. This might be the result of characteristics such as personal motivation and commitment as well as comparably high financial aspirations that are more pronounced among self-employed persons and are likely to be positively correlated with the importance of relative consumption. The coefficients do not differ significantly on the 5 per cent significance level. The results reported in columns (1) and (2) suggest that the effects of interpersonal comparisons are not confined to certain groups of society.
The question as to whether households in different parts of the income distribution are equally strongly affected by positional concerns is of particular importance with regard to the discussion about expenditure cascades and the effects of increasing inequality on the evolution of aggregate saving and consumption. 20 Column (3) thus reports income class specific point estimates. We see that for all income deciles the effect of reference consumption upon household savings is negative and statistically highly significant. The only exception is at 20 We will return to this issue in section 4.5 that discusses the implications of positional concerns for linking changing income inequality to the development of aggregate household savings.
the lowest end of the income distribution, namely the first decile group. Here, the estimated coefficient is only significant at the 10 per cent level. Income classes 5 and 6 show the largest coefficients. The entire income distribution is affected by the consumption level of the respective reference group due to interpersonal comparisons. A graphical illustration of the class specific marginal effects of reference consumption is provided in figure 1 . We see that the estimated effects do not vary systematically across income deciles 2 to 10 as all the 95 per cent confidence bands cover a spectrum ranging approximately from the point estimates of the second and the fourth income decile, i.e. values between -0.18 and -0.15. However, comparing the coefficients is not sufficient to determine whether certain parts of the income distribution are more prone to KURJ-behaviour than others. One has to take into account that the standard deviation of changes in reference consumption increases with the household's position in the income distribution. We thus multiply the estimated income-class specific effects with the standard deviation of reference consumption within the respective income classes. The resulting income-class specific impacts are contrasted in figure 2.
This representation reveals that the actual impact of changes in reference consumption rises across income deciles. Income classes 2 to 4 and 5 to 9 differ considerably. The impact is most pronounced for households within the 10th income decile. While the coefficients do not differ significantly between income classes, the impacts in classes 5 through 9 are significantly different from the impacts in classes 2 through 4. 
Robustness
Exogeneity of Reference Consumption
One central challenge the literature on interpersonal comparisons faces regards the question as to whether reference consumption can be taken as exogenous. 21 Despite the fact that we do not construct region-specific reference groups, regional specific heterogeneity can still lead to spurious correlation between own and reference consumption. Income or consumption shocks that operate below the national level might be absorbed neither by the time nor state fixed effects.
We address this crucial question in table 5. We control for time-variant unobserved heterogeneity at the state level by interacting the set of time dummies with the set of state dummies. Column (2) reports the results from a regression where the set of state-year interactions is added to the vector of control variables. We see that, compared to our baseline results (column (1)), the results remain virtually unchanged. However, unobserved local area characteristics, i.e. heterogeneity at an even less aggregated than the state level, may still drive our estimates. Higher prices in certain municipalities, for example, may increase the consumption expenditures of all households in the respective area. By slightly modifying the definition of the household's reference group, we seek to eliminate this concern. That is, we exclude those households living in the same state of residence from the household's reference group. Thus, local variations in the housing or labour market can no longer affect both the household's own level of saving or consumption and that of the reference group. While this strategy effectively removes an important part of the household's true reference group, it is the most straight forward and reliable way of checking whether local unobserved heterogeneity might affect our results. Column (3) 
Alternative Concepts of Reference Group
In our baseline concept, reference consumption is defined as the mean consumption of households above one's own consumption decile. We now examine whether the results are driven by either the consumption decile directly above the household's own decile (A) or by the consumption of those households having a significantly higher position in the perceived income distribution (B). Concept (A) means that, for example, the reference group of a household in the 5th consumption class only includes households of the 6th consumption decile. This concept is supposed to identify whether the estimated effects of upward-looking comparisons are primarily driven by movements of consumption of the very rich.
The latter idea (B) is modelled as follows: The household's reference group no longer includes the consumption class that is directly above the household's own consumption class. This specification checks whether the results are driven by households which appear to be just slightly richer. Table 6 compares the results for these alternative concepts to the baseline specification. The baseline results are presented in column (1). Columns (2) and (3) summarize the regression outcomes for the two alternative measures of reference consumption of concepts (A) and (B) respectively. We see that for both robustness specifications the results are very similar to the baseline case suggesting that both the top of the distribution as well as the close vicinity matter to the household.
[ Table 6 Our baseline results were derived on the basis of income and savings measures that were slightly smoothed by applying a three-year moving average to mitigate the influence of erratic transitory income changes. This procedure is quite common when assessing income-savings-relationships in household data as adjustments of savings to transitory income changes might not reflect a behavioural change but rather short-term outcomes of consumption smoothing behaviour. To examine to what extent our results are influenced by the degree of smoothing, we re-estimate our specification for current income and a five-year moving average of income. Table 8 illustrates the regression outcomes. Again, we see that the degree of smoothing income information does not substantially affect our results.
Are the Effects Driven by Outliers?
Finally, we examine whether our results are driven by extreme values in the distributions of the first differences of savings and income. We thus drop the top 0.1% on both sides of the distribution of the changes in own income, savings and reference consumption. Table 9 summarizes the results. We see that the effects of changes in reference consumption are not affected by outliers.
Contribution Analysis
Next we demonstrate that upward-looking comparisons exhibit economically relevant effects. To this end we analyse the explanatory power of absolute and relative income shocks vis-a-vis changes in household savings across the income distribution. This analysis reveals to what extent household savings are not only driven by changes in own income but also influenced by relative positional shifts in the income distribution. The illustrated mean changes in real net household income mimic the rise in inequality in household net income as follows: While in the 9th and 10th income decile groups real net income rose, income deciles 1 to 7 were subject to income losses. The steady increase of reference consumption from the 3rd up to the 8th income decile reflects how these absolute income changes manifest themselves in terms of variations in relative income positions. This is because the income increases of rich households led to a rise in consumption in the top percentiles of the consumption distribution. As high consumption households are part of the upper range of the income distribution income gains transmit into the distribution of consumption. 23 Consequently, for the majority of households in the upper half of the income distribution reference consumption increased substantially. More precisely, these changes resulted in the specific hierarchy of relative income shocks as portrayed in figure 3 . Here we observe that income decile groups 5 to 9 were affected most heavily by the consumption expansion of the highest consumption percentiles. Figure 4 shows the relative contributions of own income and reference consumption to the predicted variation of household savings by income deciles. This illustration offers three insights: First, according to our model, absolute and relative income shocks account for approximately 30 to 40 per cent of the variation in household savings. Second, the negative effect of perceived relative income losses on household savings is substantial. The reactions to rising reference consumption particularly affected household savings within income deciles 5 to 9. Third, the implications of changes in income inequality are even more specific, as the effects of absolute and relative income shocks on household savings may run in opposite directions. This is also visible, when comparing income deciles 5 to 7 with deciles 8 and 9. Within income deciles 5 to 7, the negative effect of rising reference consumption amplified the reduction of household savings triggered by absolute income losses. In contrast, within deciles 8 and 9, relative income losses partly counteracted the rise of savings stemming from absolute income gains.
Conclusion
In this paper we demonstrate that interpersonal comparisons lead to KURJ- Our results further help to understand the reason for the divergence of income and consumption inequality which has been found in many countries and which is usually explained by the fact that income shocks are only perceived as transitory and households consequently keep their levels of consumption comparably stable. 25 The findings in this paper suggest that the under-proportionate growth of consumption inequality might have also been driven by KURJ-behaviour: In the face of increasing reference consumption, low and middle class households increase consumption and reduce savings in an attempt to "keep up with the Joneses". 26
(2010), for Sweden by Domeij and Floden (2010) , for the United Kingdom by Blundell and Etheridge (2010) and for Germany by Fuchs-Schuendeln et al. (2010) . 26 This is in line with the findings of Kopczuk and Song (2010) as well as Blundell and Etheridge (2010) who show that the sharp increase in income inequality in the U.S. and the U.K. is mostly due to permanent instead of transitory income shocks. household does not change its consumption class j from period t − 1. CL 1 to CL 10 denote income deciles. The set of further covariates comprises changes in the number of adults and children living in the household, the number of years of education, employment status and age of the household head, state dummies and year dummies. Column (1) shows education-specific effects where LOW-EDU means that the household head has attended school for a maximum of nine years, MID-EDU includes household heads who have more than 9 but less than 13 years of schooling and who did not attend college or university. The head of HIGH-EDU households has received the maximum amount of 13 years of schooling or has attended college or university. Column (2) differentiates the effect of reference consumption with respect to the household head's employment status. Column (3) shows income-class specific effects. class j from period t − 1. CL 1 to CL 10 denote income deciles. The set of further covariates comprises changes in the number of adults and children living in the household, the number of years of education, employment status and age of the household head, state dummies and year dummies. Column (1) is the baseline estimation from table 4 (ALL-concept). In column (2), we include a full set of state-year interaction terms to capture the potential effects of state-level business cycles that are not absorbed by the year and state fixed effects. In column (3), we exclude all households living in the same state of residence from the construction of reference consumption in order to ensure that local unobserved heterogeneity does not drive the results. class j from period t − 1. CL 1 to CL 10 denote income deciles. The set of further covariates comprises changes in the number of adults and children living in the household, the number of years of education, employment status and age of the household head, state dummies and year dummies. Column (1) is the baseline estimation from table 4 (ALL-concept). Columns (2) through (4) use alternative definitions of reference group. In column (2) the reference group of a household includes only households which belong to the consumption class right above the household's own class. In column (3) the consumption class directly above the household's own class is not part of the reference group. Table 9 : Savings, Reference Consumption -Controlling for Outliers.
Appendix
(1) (2) Baseline Robustness incl. outliers excl. outliers VARIABLES Note: This figure illustrates the impact of reference consumption by income decile classes. We control for changes in consumption classes. The impact measure is obtained by multiplying the coefficients from table 4 with the standard deviation of the change in reference consumption. Note: This figure illustrates relative contributions of changes in household income and reference consumption to variations in household savings. The bars correspond to the explanatory power of both regressors and are reported in per cent. After determining the regressors' contributions, we multiplied each with the respective signs of the coefficients and of the regressors.
